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Due to the private nature of its internal investigations, research on the SEC oversight enforcement is 
limited. By distinguishing between enforcement staff’ decision to open an investigation 
(investigation decision) and commissioners’ authorization of an enforcement action (enforcement 
decision), this study is the first to examine how these two decisions interplay to overcome the 
political capture while fulfilling the SEC’s mission to protect investors. First, I do not find evidence 
that investigation decision is influenced by firms’ political connections, whereas enforcement 
decision is affected by firms’ lobbying efforts. Collectively, my results imply that there exists a 
misalignment between commissioners’ political incentives and the staff’ career incentives in the SEC 
oversight enforcement. My results also suggest that a firm’s opportunistic lobbying during an 
investigation (reactive lobbying) is effective in reducing the probability of an SEC enforcement 
action, while habitual lobbying activities in anticipation of possible adverse events (proactive 
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The oversight enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) refers to 
an entire process from a preliminary inquiry to an internal investigation to an enforcement action 
against firms or individuals charged with securities fraud. Due to resource constraints limiting 
the capacity to pursue every securities violation, the SEC must exercise discretion in how to 
prioritize investigation targets and institute enforcement actions.  
Research on regulatory oversight is rooted in a view of rational actors seeking to 
maximize their utility. On the one hand, regulatory capture theory postulates that firms and 
special-interest groups use money and votes to extract political rent and wield pressure on 
regulators (e.g., Stigler 1971, Peltzman 1976, Watts and Zimmerman 1978). On the other hand, 
the human capital hypothesis conjectures that career goals motivate regulators to practice 
rigorous investigations to demonstrate their competence to future employers (Zheng 2015, 
Vadenbergh et al. 2020). Although some studies document lax SEC enforcement on politically 
connected firms (e.g., Correia 2014, Yu and Yu 2012), the extent to which political connections 
mitigate regulatory interventions remain less explored primarily due to research design 
challenges. SEC investigations are privately conducted and unobservable to firm outsiders. This 
issue complicates the interpretations of the empirical association between political lobbying and 
SEC enforcement; that is, whether it is enforcement staff who are less likely to investigate 
politically connected firms, thereby resulting in a lower likelihood of enforcement actions or 
whether it is SEC commissioners who are less prone to authorize enforcement actions against 
those firms. 
Using undisclosed SEC investigations to overcome empirical challenges, I study two 
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research questions: first, the effect of habitual lobbying activities on enforcement staff’ decision 
to open an investigation (investigation decision) and second, the effect of opportunistic lobbying 
efforts on commissioners’ authorization of an enforcement action (enforcement decision). By 
distinguishing between these two decisions, this paper provides insights into how career and 
political incentives individually perceived by commissioners and enforcement staff optimize the 
SEC’s oversight enforcement practices. 
Although the SEC is responsible for monitoring and bringing charges against firms 
committing fraudulent misconduct, the SEC is under sustained pressure from its overseers who 
have ties with politically connected firms. Prior studies identify firms’ political connections as 
frictions that impede the task of the SEC enforcement. If it is true that regulatory capture affects 
the SEC’s enforcement discretion, I expect decreased investigative and enforcement activities 
directed toward politically connected firms. Such a finding would imply that the SEC is 
systemically captured by firms’ political lobbying.  
On the other hand, career incentives may dominate the SEC’s regulatory decisions. 
Building a strong record of diligent work ethics and expertise may motivate regulators to conduct 
stringent enforcement practices based primarily on the leads and evidentiary fact. Brown et al. 
(2006) argue that firms with higher litigation risk and regulatory oversight have incentives to 
acquire political connections. To the extent that political connections signal a fraudulent firm’s 
attempt to circumvent or evade regulatory interventions, I expect an increase in SEC oversight 
enforcement against politically connected firms. 
I collect data on firms’ lobbying activities from LobbyView and the Center for 
Responsive Politics (CRP) from 1998 (the first year the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 
required lobbying disclosure) through 2018. Unlike prior studies considering all lobbying 
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activities (e.g., Correia 2014, Yu and Yu 2012), I retain lobbying aimed only at the Senate, the 
House of Representatives, the SEC, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO).1 The existing literature on mechanisms through which firms exert political 
pressure on the SEC argues that lobbying firms form alliances with members of Congress who 
use budget appropriations, approvals of chair and commissioner appointments, and congressional 
hearings to influence the SEC’s enforcement practices (Heese et al. 2017, Correia 2014). I 
collect lobbying activities directed at the DOJ because, under Rule 2 of the SEC’s Rules Relating 
to Investigation, SEC staff frequently communicate and share investigative files with other 
governmental authorities (Missal et al. 2007). For the SEC’s oversight enforcement activities, I 
obtain raw data on all closed SEC investigations between January 1, 2000 and August 2, 2017 
from Blackburne et al. (2020) and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs).2  
To assess the impact of firms’ political connections at each stage in the oversight 
enforcement process, I begin my analyses by examining whether enforcement staff are less likely 
to initiate a formal investigation against lobbying firms, relative to non-lobbying firms. I do not 
find evidence that the likelihood of the SEC opening an investigation is statistically associated 
with a firm’s lobbying activities, after controlling for firm characteristics associated with the 
SEC enforcement and predicted fraud scores derived from a machine learning model (Correia 
2014, Bao et al. 2019). Recognizing that insignificant associations may be due to 
misspecifications or erroneous identification strategy, I conduct a battery of robustness tests to 
validate my result. 
First, I examine the likelihood that a lobbying firm undergoes an investigation as a 
 
1 For example, it does not seem plausible that lobbying activities toward the Department of Education is relevant to 
the SEC oversight enforcement. 
2 Blackburne et al. (2020) obtain undisclosed formal SEC investigation data through the Freedom of Information Act 
office of the SEC.  
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function of direct lobbying channel (lobbying toward the SEC, the DOJ, or SEC revolving door 
lobbyists) and indirect lobbying channel (lobbying toward the Senate, the House of 
Representatives, or the CBO). For the subsample of lobbying firms, I find that neither direct nor 
indirect lobbying channels are statistically related to the likelihood of an SEC investigation.  
I next refine the indirect lobbying channel by looking into lobbying toward SEC-relevant 
committees in Congress. Mehta and Zhao (2020) identify the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs and House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services as 
committees with the most influence over the SEC with oversight jurisdiction. They document 
that congressional influence on the SEC impairs its regulatory effectiveness. Following the same 
notion, I hypothesize that firms lobbying members of Congress serving in the SEC-relevant 
committees are less likely to be subject to the SEC oversight enforcement than firms that do not 
lobby the SEC-relevant committees. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, however, does not 
mandate lobbying registrants to disclose the identity of recipients. If such information were 
available, I could have traced which committee lobbying payment was intended to. As an 
alternative, I analyze specific issue area codes disclosed in lobbying reports. As the two SEC-
relevant committees are primarily concerned with matters related to finance/securities and 
taxation, I expect that firms lobbying on these issues are likely to contact members serving in the 
SEC-relevant committees.  
The results show positive associations between lobbying issues on finance/securities and 
budget and the likelihood of an SEC investigation. It is possible that lobbying on sensitive issues 
involving finance/securities and budget appropriations may have a spillover effect on regulatory 
monitoring, resulting in a higher likelihood of an SEC investigation. Holzman et al. (2020) 
document that SEC investigation activities are positively associated with firms’ visibility. As 
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finance/securities and budgeting are salient issues that draw much attention from media and 
public scrutiny, firms lobbying on these issues may become more exposed to SEC staff’ 
surveillance activities.  
I also run probit regressions with an instrumental variable. Specifically, I use firm-level 
political risk as an instrument. Hassan et al. (2019) construct the measure using a computational 
linguistics approach by reading conference calls. Their paper documents that firms with high 
political risk are more likely to actively lobby and donate to politicians. The IV probit regression 
does not show a statistical relation between corporate lobbying activities and the probability of 
an SEC investigation. 
Additionally, I substitute three-year lobbying with one-year lobbying activities prior to an 
onset of an investigation. It is possible that a firm’s contemporaneous, newly established political 
connections exert a stronger influence on the staff’ choice of investigation targets than those 
established in distant periods. The results do not present statistically significant relations. 
To address the concern that lobbying firms and non-lobbying firms are systematically 
different, I construct an entropy-balanced sample using a vector of determinants that prior studies 
link to the SEC enforcement, as well as macro and micro factors through industry and year 
matches. The estimated coefficients across almost all specifications do not yield statistical 
associations between a firm’s lobbying activities and the likelihood of the firm undergoing an 
SEC investigation. Taken together, my validity tests support that SEC staff’ investigative 
activities are conducted based upon the merits of each case regardless of a firm’s political 
profile. 
I next examine whether commissioners’ enforcement discretion is influenced by firms’ 
opportunistic lobbying efforts. Unlike prior studies that utilize the presence (or expenditure 
6  
level) of lobbying activities prior to enforcement outcomes, my analyses exploit the percent 
change in lobbying expenditures after the onset of an SEC investigation. This research design 
enables me to draw clearer inferences about the efficacy of corporate lobbying in the midst of an 
investigation, as I examine how lobbying firms opportunistically respond to an investigation. 
Results indicate that the increase in corporate lobbying expenditures subsequent to an SEC 
investigation is negatively associated with an AAER issuance. In terms of economic 
significance, one standard deviation increase in the percent change in lobbying expenditures 
corresponds to a 19.3 percent lower likelihood of receiving an AAER relative to the 
unconditional probability of receiving an AAER in my sample. As SEC investigations span 2.8 
years on average in my sample, I also examine two-year percent change in lobbying 
expenditures. Consistent with previous analysis, I find a negative association between two-year 
percent change in lobbying expenditures and the likelihood of an AAER issuance. One standard 
deviation increase in the two-year percent change in lobbying expenditures translates to a 22.7 
percent lower likelihood of an AAER issuance. 
Following the same identification strategy as in the SEC investigation analyses, I then 
divide lobbying efforts into direct and indirect lobbying channels. Results are consistent with an 
indirect channel of lobbying efforts toward Congress, suggesting that firms seeking preferential 
treatment through congressional lobbying channel are less likely to face an SEC enforcement 
action. Contrary to my predictions, I generally do not observe statistical associations between 
direct lobbying efforts toward regulatory bodies and an AAER issuance. One possible 
explanation for this finding is that the SEC may be concerned about backfire if the public 
suspects the SEC of steering weaker enforcement practices against firms that lobby the SEC 
directly (Heese et al. 2017).  
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Analyzing the relation between lobbying issues and enforcement decision, I find that the 
percent change in taxation-related lobbying expenditures is negatively associated with an 
incident of AAERs. Although I cannot definitively claim that the SEC-relevant committees 
overseeing taxation issues constitute the influence on commissioners’ enforcement decisions, a 
key finding that a firm’s lobbying efforts in seeking congressional influence during an 
investigation lead to a lower likelihood of an SEC enforcement action remains unchanged. 
My study adds an important dimension to the literature on SEC enforcement. Prior 
research typically treats the SEC oversight enforcement as a centralized process in which 
investigation/enforcement decision is made uniformly across decision-making groups. However, 
the staff’ investigative practices may not necessarily reflect senior management’s political 
agenda. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to study the misalignment of 
individual-level incentives between SEC commissioners and enforcement staff, as opposed to 
prior studies that focus on organization-wide incentives. Notwithstanding career and reputation 
concerns, commissioners are political appointees and therefore are keenly sensitive to the 
interests of Congress. As such, they are constrained in their decisions by external political 
pressures. However, enforcement staff are less susceptible to political pressure and have 
incentives to optimize investigative activities according to their career concerns. Collectively, 
my findings suggest that commissioners’ political agenda may not be aligned with how 
enforcement staff shall perform their investigative duties. 
This study also contributes to the literature on corporate lobbying. This paper is the first 
to distinguish between proactive and reactive lobbying engagement. Proactive lobbying 
activities relate to whether a firm’s habitual lobbying engagement influences the staff’ 
investigation decision, whereas reactive lobbying efforts pertain to a firm’s increase in lobbying 
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expenditures during an investigation as means to mitigate enforcement risks. While I do not find 
evidence that proactive lobbying activities curry favor with an SEC investigation, I document 
that the regulatory relief is more attributable to firms’ strategic, reactive lobbying efforts. It is 
plausible that reactive lobbying efforts implicitly targeting matters related to an ongoing 









2.1. SEC oversight enforcement process  
Figure 1 illustrates the SEC oversight enforcement process. It begins with a lead of 
possible existence of federal securities violations obtained from various sources such as external 
complaints, media reports, whistleblowers, and referrals from other divisions or government 
agencies. Enforcement staff determines whether it is appropriate to open a Matter Under Inquiry 
(MUI), which is a preliminary step towards instituting a full investigation.3 Some considerations 
used to determine MUIs include, but are not limited to: (1) rules and statues violated; (2) 
magnitude of the violation; (3) losses and harm to investors; and (4) whether potentially harmed 
group is vulnerable or at risk. Based on the set of facts enforcement staff gathers, a MUI is either 
closed or converted to a formal investigation within sixty days. The decision to open an 
investigation indicates that the suspected violations of securities laws involve serious misconduct 
and merit an investment of the SEC resources. 
During an investigation, the staff acts as an officer of the SEC with a formal order of 
investigation. The formal order empowers the staff with the authority to subpoena witnesses, 
administer oaths, and produce documents.4 Communications between the SEC and individuals 
involved in an investigation are conducted through a Wells notice in which the staff informs the 
individuals of specific charges of securities violations and a preliminary determination of 
enforcement actions. The recipients can provide a written statement setting forth their position 
 
3 Since 2009, the Division of Enforcement developed written procedures for review and approval of opening new 
investigations. The manual is available at www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce.shtml. 
4 Section 19(c) of the Securities Act, Section 21(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, Section 209(b) of the Advisers 
Act, and Section 42(b) of the Investment Company Act describe the SEC’s authority to designate any officer to issue 
subpoenas and testify under oath. 
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regarding the subject matter to the staff. 
Upon the completion of an investigation, enforcement staff submits an action 
memorandum with an analysis of the factual and legal foundation to SEC commissioners, 
seeking an approval of enforcement recommendations. Commissioners then vote on whether to 
approve or reject the recommendations in a closed meeting.  
2.2. Guidelines for reporting lobbying activities  
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 mandates lobby registrants and organizations to 
register (LD-1) and file lobbying activities report (LD-2) with the Secretary of the Senate and the 
Clerk of the House of Representatives.5 Current rules require a lobbying registrant to register and 
report activities if a total income from a particular client exceeds $3,000 during a quarterly 
period. An organization is required to register and file reports if the total lobbying expenses 
exceed $13,000 during a quarterly period. 6  Registration is required within 45 days after a 
lobbyist is either employed or retained for the initial lobbying contract.  
A lobbying registrant files separate lobbying reports for each client, while an 
organization files a single report covering all in-house lobbying activities for each quarterly 
reporting period. The lobbying report is required within 20 days after the end of the quarterly 
period.7  A registrant is required to file the lobbying report regardless of whether lobbying 
activities are present during a period, checking “no activity” box on the report even if no 
 
5 Under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, lobbying registrants are defined as entities with one or more lobbyists 
who act as lobbyists for outside clients. Organizations are those who employ in-house lobbyists. Note that lobbying 
registrants or organizations with in-house lobbyists are subject to the disclosure requirement, not clients (lobbying 
firms) which contracts with lobbying registrants. Throughout the paper, politically connected firms are lobbying 
firms. 
6 The registration thresholds have continued to increase over the past years since the enactment of the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act. One major amendment was made in 2007 (Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007) 
in which the period for registration and lobbying activity report changed from a semiannual basis to a quarterly 
basis. 
7 Each lobbying activity report is assigned a unique identifier after being filed with the Congress. I use these unique 
identifiers to match lobbying information between LobbyView and CRP. 
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According to regulatory capture theory, regulatory agencies are charged with 
responsibilities toward public interest objectives in their early period. As agencies mature, 
however, they become more concerned about the interests of the industries they regulate and are 
drawn away from serving the public interests. Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) argue that 
special-interest groups use money and votes to extract political rent. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) discuss that political connections formed through lobbying and campaign contributions 
foist pressure on regulators and policy makers.8 Revolving door lobbyists also play a pivotal role 
in influencing regulatory bodies (e.g., Bertrand et al. 2014, deHaan et al. 2015). As regulatory 
authorities are subject to outside checks and controls through congressional hearings, budget 
appropriations, and appointments approvals, they are likely to refrain from carrying out activities 
that can aggravate their overseers. In fact, members of Congress spend a significant amount of 
time and resources intervening with federal regulators on behalf of their constituents (Ohnesorge 
2019). 
Federal regulatory bodies such as the SEC have considerable discretion in prioritizing 
firms they investigate, while being subject to comparatively little regulatory accountability (e.g., 
Solomon and Soltes 2019, Zaring 2016, Barkow 2016). Prior studies document that a firm’s 
 
8 I focus on corporate lobbying activities and exclude PAC campaign contributions to study the impact of political 
connections on the SEC oversight enforcement. For lobbying, there is no cap with respect to the amount of lobbying 
expenditures that can be funded from corporate treasury. In contrast, firms are not allowed to contribute to political 
campaigns directly. Instead, they form Political Action Committees (PACs) through which executives, employees, 
and family members contribute voluntarily to support a candidate up to a maximum limit. Therefore, the managers’ 
underlying goal of contributing to PACs can be contaminated (or diluted) by the contributions from employees and 
family members, which makes it not suitable for my study. In addition, PACs are cyclical, clustered around 
elections, and location (candidate)-dependent. Given the timing of SEC investigations is random, corporate lobbying 
is unambiguously a better candidate to study the impact of political connections. Finally, the size of PAC donations 
is comparatively nine times smaller than that of corporate lobbying (Milyo et al. 2000, Yu and Yu 2012). 
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political connections influence the way the SEC makes enforcement decisions. Correia (2014) 
finds that political connections are negatively related to SEC enforcement, as measured by the 
likelihood of financial restatements and the magnitude of monetary penalties. Yu and Yu (2012) 
document that lobbying firms evade fraud detection longer. Barkow (2016) postulates that, even 
if career staff seeks enforcement actions, political appointees convinced by well-connected firms 
may not move forward with enforcing the law. Heese et al. (2017), however, present a positive 
association between political connections and the probability of SEC comment letters. They 
attribute the contrasting findings to a risk of voter backlash when the public becomes aware of 
egregious regulatory favor rendered to politically connected firms.  
On the other hand, human capital hypothesis posits that individuals who develop strong 
skills and experiences while working at the SEC may conduct stringent enforcement activities to 
demonstrate their competence to future employers (Zheng 2015). Vandenbergh et al. (2020) 
argue that the positive reputation of diligent work and expertise incentivizes regulators to 
perform duties by adhering to enforcement rules and regulations. If a regulator perceives the 
benefits of growing human capital, the regulator may become motivated to conduct rigorous 
enforcement practices regardless of firms’ political connections. 
Extant research relies solely on enforcement outcomes such as AAERs or monetary 
penalties, assuming that the SEC makes enforcement decisions uniformly across the 
organization. As I note in Section 2.1, the SEC oversight enforcement is a multi-stage, black box 
process involving the staff’ investigation decision and commissioners’ enforcement decision. It 
is possible that career incentives and political incentives each perceived by commissioners and 
enforcement staff are not aligned with each other. By taking advantage of undisclosed SEC 
investigations to distinguish between investigation and enforcement decisions, I take a novel 
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approach to evaluating the impact of corporate political connections at each stage in the SEC 
oversight enforcement.9  
First, it is unclear ex ante whether political connections should be associated with a 
likelihood of SEC staff’ investigation. On the one hand, capitalizing on the notion of regulatory 
capture, the staff’ decision to open an investigation may be influenced by corporate lobbying 
activities. The political climate lingering at the senior management may pervade the cultural 
norms on their investigation practices. If the staff share the same sense of the SEC’s political 
agenda and are keen on senior management’s political concerns, the political influence may 
govern the ways the staff select firms for an investigation. It is also possible that the staff receive 
countermanding or dilutive messages inconsistent with the SEC’s code of conduct and ethics 
from senior management. If so, it implies that there is systemic regulatory capture at the SEC, 
resulting in a joint effect of the staff’ and commissioners’ propensity not to institute regulatory 
interventions against politically connected firms.  
On the other hand, career concerns may dominate how enforcement staff decide on the 
choice of investigation targets. To the staff, building a strong record of due diligence guided by 
the SEC’s enforcement rules of conduct creates an advantage for accessing future career 
opportunities. In other words, political incentives of senior management may not be aligned with 
career incentives of staff employees. It is also possible that corporate lobbying signals a 
fraudulent firm’s attempt to circumvent or evade regulatory interventions. Then, enforcement 
staff may respond by increasing their investigative activities against the lobbying firm.  
 
9 Prior studies on political connections and the SEC enforcement do not distinguish between lobbying activities and 
bribery. Some critics argue that the enforcement benefit discussed in the studies are subject to violations of the 
federal bribery and corruption statutes. Although it is not the focus of my study, I argue that corporate lobbying and 
its influence on regulatory outcomes do not constitute bribery, as there is no explicit guarantee of regulatory 
protection in exchange for lobbying payment. In addition, based on the principal-agent framework suggested by 
James (2011) and Dal Bo (2006) to illustrate the definition of bribery, I argue that corporate lobbying in the context 
of the SEC enforcement is not a form of bribery. 
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There are several reasons as to why commissioners may take a laissez-faire approach on 
staff-level investigations. First, congressional budget justification. The SEC reports and testifies 
its enforcement metrics during budget appropriations before Congress every year. According to 
Congressional Budget Justification Annual Performance Plan/Report, investigation volume and 
timeliness are presented as key performance metrices to justify its budget requests. Velikonja 
(2016) documents that the SEC overstates its performance statistics to avoid budget cuts and 
continue enforcing the securities laws. As the chair and commissioners are responsible for 
securing resources in a sustainable manner, they may support the staff’ stringent investigative 
activities based on the merit of each case rather than influencing the choice of investigative 
targets. Second, impartial investigations can deter managerial malfeasance. As investigations are 
a costly process entailing media scrutiny, legal battles, and SEC subpoenas, firms regardless of 
their political connections may avoid fraudulent misconduct that can trigger regulatory 
interventions. Lastly, limited attention of SEC commissioners may hinder their involvement in 
every investigation decision. It would be unpragmatic for commissioners, among many other 
responsibilities across various divisions within the SEC, to determine which investigation should 
be opened or dropped. Therefore, I state my first hypothesis (in null form) as follows:  
H1: The SEC’s investigation decision is not associated with corporate lobbying activities.  
 
Prior studies generally find that firms with political connections are less likely to be 
subject to enforcement actions. However, in the absence of information about the SEC’s internal 
investigations, inferences from prior studies lead to two possible interpretations: (1) enforcement 
staff are less likely to open internal investigations against politically connected firms, thereby 
resulting in a lower likelihood of enforcement outcomes, or (2) the staff conduct investigations 
based on the merit regardless of firms’ political ties, but commissioners are less likely to 
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authorize enforcement actions against politically connected firms.  
Anecdotally, the SEC is under sustained political pressure deriving from budget 
appropriations, appointment authority, and congressional oversight. Any adverse decisions 
against politically connected firms can jeopardize funding and resources that support the SEC as 
well as commissioners’ reputation. As such, commissioners may be incentivized to suppress 
staff-level investigations against lobbying firms, let alone an approval of enforcement actions. 
On the other hand, SEC commissioners may balance regulatory capture with political 
cost. If the public becomes aware of preferential enforcement treatment directed toward 
politically connected firms, the SEC can face strong criticisms from the public, media, as well as 
its overseers. This can jeopardize commissioners’ future career down the line. As such, the 
concerns of such backlash may attenuate lenient enforcement practices against firms with 
political connections. In fact, Heese et al. (2017) find positive associations between political 
connections and the SEC’s periodic filing reviews. Therefore, I state my second hypothesis (in 
null form) as follows: 
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Research Design and Sample Selection 
 
4.1. Research design  
I examine the relation between a firm’s propensity to engage in lobbying activities and 
the likelihood of an SEC internal investigation (Hypothesis 1) using the following regression 
model: 
SEC_Investigation i,t+1 = a0 + a1 Lobby_3yr i,t  + a2 Size i,t  + a3 BM i,t + a4 Leverage i,t + a5 
Age i,t + a6 SP500 i,t + a7 Analysts i,t + a8 DACC i,t + a9 Distance i,t 
+ a10 Fraud_score i,t  + Year_FE + Industry_FE + ε 
(1) 
SEC_Investigation is an indicator variable set to one if the SEC initiates an internal 
investigation against a firm in year t+1, and zero if the SEC does not investigate the firm. My 
main variable of interest in equation (1) is Lobby_3yr, an indicator variable set to one if a firm 
engaged in corporate lobbying activities toward at least one of the contacts (i.e., the Senate, the 
House of Representative, SEC, DOJ, and CBO) at least once in years t, t-1, and t-2, and zero 
otherwise. 10  Consistent with my prediction following the framework of regulatory capture 
(human capital hypothesis), I expect a negative (positive) and significant coefficient on 
Lobby_3yr. I also substitute Lobby_3yr with Lobby_1yr, an indicator variable set to one if a firm 
engaged in lobbying activities toward at least one of the five contacts in year t to evaluate short-
term lobbying effect. 
I follow the stream of research on the SEC enforcement (e.g. Correia 2014 and Yu and 
Yu 2012) in selecting the vector of controls in equation (1). Specifically, I account for firm size 
(MarketCap), book-to-market (BM), financial risk (Leverage), firm age (Age) and the level of 
 
10 Correia (2014) select a five- or three-year window depending on the estimation model for lobbying expenditures. 
Yu and Yu (2012) define a lobbying firm as a firm engaging in lobbying activities during the sample period (1998-
2005). 
18  
discretionary accruals (DACC). Following Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) on the SEC enforcement 
preferences, I include the number of analysts’ following (Analysts), an indicator variable for 
S&P 500 index (SP500) and a distance measure between a firm’s headquarter and the closest 
SEC regional office (or the SEC office conducting an investigation) (Distance). Since it is 
unclear whether politically connected firms are likely to commit misconduct that can trigger an 
SEC investigation, I control for a firm’s fraud risk (Fraud_score), a predicted fraud score 
developed by Bao et al. (2019) using a machine learning model. Finally, to account for 
macroeconomic and industry-specific factors, I include Fama-French 48 industry and year fixed 
effects. To accommodate the panel structure of the data, I cluster the standard errors by firm 
(Petersen 2009). Since the dependent variable is binary, I evaluate the model using a logit 
estimator. I also verify that the inferences are similar using a linear probability model. To 
mitigate the possible omitted variable concerns, I re-estimate the equation by substituting 
industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects. This specification enables me to focus on time-
variant factors in the relationship. 
I note that there exist various channels through which corporate lobbying influences SEC 
investigations. Thus, I analyze the likelihood a lobbying firm undergoes an investigation as a 
function of direct lobbying and indirect lobbying activities. To this end, I modify Equation (1) by 
substituting Lobby_3yr with Lobby_Contact to examine how each channel of lobbying activities 
affects the staff’ investigation decision. I consider six alternative definitions of the treatment 
variable, Lobby_Contact: 
(1) An indicator variable taking a value of one if lobbying contact is the Senate at least once 
in years t, t-1, and t-2, zero otherwise (Lobby_Senate), 
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(2) An indicator variable taking a value of one if lobbying contact is the House of 
Representatives at least once in years t, t-1, and t-2, zero otherwise (Lobby_House), 
(3) An indicator variable taking a value of one if lobbying contact is the SEC at least once in 
years t, t-1, and t-2, zero otherwise (Lobby_SEC), 
(4) An indicator variable taking a value of one if lobbying contact is the DOJ at least once in 
years t, t-1, and t-2, zero otherwise (Lobby_DOJ), 
(5) An indicator variable taking a value of one if lobbying contact is the CBO at least once in 
years t, t-1, and t-2, zero otherwise (Lobby_Budget), 
(6) An indicator variable taking a value of one if lobbying activities involve SEC revolving 
door lobbyists at least once in years t, t-1, and t-2, zero otherwise (Lobby_Revolving). 
I use this approach to distinguish between indirect congressional effect and direct 
regulator effect on the SEC oversight enforcement.  
Mehta and Zhao (2020) identify the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs and House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services as committees with the 
most influence over the SEC with oversight jurisdiction. Following their notion, I expect that 
lobbying activities aimed at SEC-relevant committees should induce stronger pressure to the 
SEC, relative to lobbying activities toward other committees. The Lobbying Disclosure Act, 
however, does not mandate registrants to disclose the identity of individuals receiving lobbying 
payment.11 Ideally, if the names of congressional members were disclosed in the report, I could 
have traced which committee of Congress lobbying payment was made to.  
As an alternative approach, I collect issue area codes lobbyists mark in the reports (e.g. 
 
11 Rulemaking petitions for transparent political spending were filed with the SEC in 2011 and 2014 to no avail. 
Former SEC Chair Mary Jo White was against the idea that the SEC should be involved in politics. In Feb 2019, a 
new bill was introduced (H.R. 1053) directing the SEC to issue guidance on mandatory political expenditure 
disclosures by public companies. 
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FIN, TAX, or BUD).12 Based on Mehta and Zhao (2020), the two SEC-relevant committees have 
jurisdiction on matters related to finance/securities-related issues and taxation. I assume that 
firms lobbying on these issues are likely to contact members of Congress serving in the SEC-
relevant committees, while firms lobbying on natural environment, for example, are more likely 
to contact members serving in the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. As 
such, I substitute Lobby_3yr with Lobby_Issue, a proxy for lobbying activities toward SEC-
relevant committees. I consider five alternative definitions for Lobby_Issue: 
(1) An indicator variable taking a value of one if lobbying activities include financial 
institutions/securities issues (FIN) at least once in years t, t-1, and t-2, zero otherwise 
(Lobby_Fin), 
(2) An indicator variable taking a value of one if lobbying activities include taxation/internal 
revenue code (TAX) at least once in years t, t-1, and t-2, zero otherwise (Lobby_Tax), 
(3) An indicator variable taking a value of one if lobbying activities include accounting 
(ACC) at least once in years t, t-1, and t-2, zero otherwise (Lobby_Acc), 
(4) An indicator variable taking a value of one if lobbying activities include 
budget/appropriations (BUD) at least once in years t, t-1, and t-2, zero otherwise 
(Lobby_Bud), 
(5) An indicator variable taking a value of one if lobbying activities include torts (TOR) at 
least once in years t, t-1, and t-2, zero otherwise (Lobby_Tor), 
I select FIN, TAX, and ACC issue codes because members of Congress contacted for 
these issues are most likely to be members on SEC-relevant committees. 13  I also examine 
 
12 There are currently 79 lobby issue area codes available in the system. Registrants indicate lobbying issue codes in 
a lobbying report. 
13 I do not observe lobbying reports that explicitly mention issues related to SEC’s ongoing investigations or 
regulatory enforcement actions against lobbying firms.  
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lobbying activities on budget/appropriations issues (BUD), following prior literature identifying 
budget appropriations as one of the methods to exert pressure on the SEC. As a falsification test, 
I consider torts (TOR) issue code. Although congressional members contacted for torts issue may 
not serve in SEC-relevant committees, it is related with misdemeanors, violations, and litigations. 
Insignificant estimated coefficients on the variable contribute to mitigating the concern of 
spurious correlations as an alternative explanation. 
Next, I examine the relation between SEC commissioners’ enforcement decision and 
corporate lobbying efforts. After the SEC opens an investigation, a firm may employ various 
means to reduce the firm’s legal liability and the probability of an enforcement action (e.g., 
cooperation with investigators, remediation efforts, etc.). I speculate that lobbying firms would 
strategically dedicate more resources to political lobbying during an ongoing investigation to 
curb the likelihood of an enforcement action (Hypothesis 2). Blackburne et al. (2020) document 
that corporate insiders become aware of an onset of a formal SEC investigation by showing a 
spike in insider selling activities around the period. I implement the analysis using the following 
model using a sample of firms that undergo an SEC investigation: 
SEC_Enforcement i,t+n = a0 + a1 Ch_Lobby i,t  + a2 Size i,t  + a3 BM i,t + a4 Leverage i,t + a5 
Age i,t + a6 SP500 i,t + a7 Analysts i,t + a8 DACC i,t + a9 Distance i,t 
+ Year_FE + Industry_FE + ε 
(2) 
SEC_Enforcement is an indicator variable set to one if a firm receives an AAER between 
the opening and two years after the closing of an investigation, conditional on the firm being 
investigated by the SEC, and zero otherwise. 14  My treatment variable in equation (2) is 
Ch_Lobby, the percent change in lobbying expenditures from year t when the SEC opens an 
 
14 The SEC does not provide the nature nor the outcome of investigations (Blackburne et al. 2020). Thus, it is not 
possible to directly link AAERs to SEC investigations obtained from the SEC. I focus on AAERs issued on dates 
between the opening date of an investigation and within two years after the closing date of the investigation to 
ensure the sequential link from an investigation to final enforcement outcomes. 
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investigation to year t+1. Following the prediction of regulatory capture, I expect a negative and 
significant coefficient on Ch_Lobby.  
My research design is innovative relative to that from prior literature, as I measure the 
change in lobbying expenditures upon the initiation of an SEC investigation. The results from 
this research design help understand how a firm’s opportunistic, reactive lobbying efforts are 
related to an enforcement outcome.15  In contrast, previous studies exclusively focus on the 
presence (or expenditure level) of lobbying activities prior to enforcement outcomes due to the 
private nature of the SEC’s internal investigations. In addition, as lobbying activities tend to be 
persistent, it is difficult to draw causal inferences if I solely examine habitual lobbying activities 
prior to enforcement outcomes. 
Following the same conjecture that lobbying firms can establish political connections 
through various channels, I substitute Ch_Lobby with Ch_Lobby_Contact to examine the 
efficacy of direct and indirect lobbying efforts on the enforcement decision. Ch_Lobby_Contact 
measures the percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures from year t when the SEC opens 
an investigation to year t+1 for each contact. This specification allows me to evaluate how 
various lobbying channels provide lobbying firms with preferential enforcement treatment. I 
expect negative and significant estimated coefficients for all variables of interest. 
I also consider whether a lobbying firm’s political ties to SEC-relevant committees affect 
the enforcement decision. I substitute Ch_Lobby with Ch_Lobby_Issue, a variable measuring the 
percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures from year t when the SEC opens an 
investigation to year t+1 for each lobbying issue area code.  
Considering that an average length of an SEC investigation is 2.8 years (untabulated), I 
 
15 Blackburne et al. (2020) argue that the opening of an investigation in unambiguously an important date in the life-
cycle of the investigation. I assume a firm is highly motivated to lobby opportunistically around the onset of an 
investigation. 
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substitute Ch_Lobby with Ch_Lobby_2yr, the percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures 
in year t when the SEC opens an investigation to the firm’s average lobbying expenditures in 
years t+1 and t+2.16 This treatment variable would reveal whether a firm’s commitment to long-
term strategic lobbying efforts for the duration of an SEC investigation induces stronger 
regulatory favor. In line with previous analyses, I construct Ch_Lobby_Contact_2yr and 
Ch_Lobby_Issue_2yr to analogously measure the percent change in lobbying expenditures from 
year t when the SEC opens an investigation to the average lobbying expenditures in years t+1 
and t+2 with respect to each lobbying contact and lobbying issue area code. I expect negative 
and significant estimated coefficients for all variables of interest.  
4.2. Sample Selection  
I obtain data for the analyses from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), LobbyView 
(corporate lobbying), the SEC (internal investigations and AAERs), Compustat/CRSP (financial 
and market data). I begin by collecting from CRP and LobbyView all U.S. firms’ lobbying 
activities from 1998 to 2018. One advantage of LobbyView is that one can run a query for 
lobbying activities by a firm identifier (GVKEY). LobbyView also makes periodic lobbying 
report easily accessible. Using a unique lobbying report identifier, I match lobbying information 
on LobbyView with that from CRP in which I obtain additional lobbying details including 
lobbyist identities (e.g., SEC revolving door lobbyists) and contacts for lobbying activities. 
Unlike prior research (Correia 2014, Yu and Yu 2011, Heese et al. 2017) considering all 
lobbying activities, I retain lobbying activities aimed only at the Senate, the House of 
Representatives, SEC, DOJ, and CBO. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 mandates lobby 
 
16 Blackburne et al. (2020) find that the average length of SEC investigation is three years.  
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registrants to file lobbying activities report semiannually and was amended in 2007 to quarterly-
basis reports. Thus, I aggregate lobbying activities by firm and year.  
Firms generally lobby multiple contacts on multiple issues in each period. However, the 
lobbying report does not indicate the exact expenditure level for each contact (or issue). Thus, I 
assign the amount for each contact (or issue) by dividing the total lobbying expenditures by the 
total number of contacts (issues) disclosed in each lobbying report. This yields a sample of 
71,488 firm-year observations with 11,379 lobbying activities. I present the sample selection 
procedure in Table 2, Panel A. As documented in Table 2, Panel B, between 8 and 21 percent of 
the sample firms conduct lobbying activities at least once in the past three years. Panel C 
presents a distribution of the sample lobbying firms by industry. I observe that certain industries 
display a high concentration of lobbying activities (e.g., utilities) relative to other industries. This 
is consistent with the prediction of the regulatory capture theory in that certain industries subject 
to strong regulation and litigation risk have incentives to engage in lobbying activities. 
I collect data on SEC investigations from 2000 to 2017 and AAERs from 1999 to 2019. 
SEC investigations are obtained from filing the requests with the FOIA office at the SEC. The 
dataset includes information on the identities of firms investigated by the SEC, open and close 
dates of an investigation, and SEC regional office conducting the investigation. I obtain AAERs 
from AAER Dataset of University of Southern California. In Panel B, I observe between 1 and 7 














Table 3 presents descriptive statistics. Starting with the full sample (Panel A), I note that 
3.5 percent of firms undergo an SEC investigation at least once between 2000 and 2017. With 
respect to Lobby_3yr (Lobby_1yr), I find that, on average, 16 (15) percent of firms engage in 
lobbying activities. For the subsample of lobbying firms, 98 percent of firms contact the Senate 
or House of Representatives for lobbying activities, while 5 (12) [2] percent of firms lobby the 
SEC (DOJ) [CBO]. SEC revolving door lobbyists (Lobby_Revolving) are involved in 
approximately 14 percent of lobbying activities. Turning to issue area codes disclosed in 
lobbying reports, I find that 18, 51, and 3 percent of firms conduct lobbying activities on 
finance/securities (Lobby_Fin), taxation/internal revenue code (Lobby_Tax), and accounting 
(Lobby_Acc), respectively. The mean values of Lobby_Bud (Lobby_Tor) indicates that 43 (7) 
percent of firms lobby on budgeting/appropriations (torts) issues. Taken together, most frequent 
lobbying activities in my sample firms are concentrated on taxation and budgeting issues.17  
For the subsample of firms undergoing an SEC investigation, the mean value of AAER 
indicates that 15 percent of firms receive an enforcement action. Compared to lobbying 
expenditures in the year when the SEC commences an investigation, lobbying firms increase 
lobbying expenditures by 19 percent in the following year (Ch_Lobby). With respect to the 
change in lobbying expenditures by contacts, I find that lobbying firms increase lobbying 
expenditures aimed at the Senate and House of Representatives both by 20 percent 
(Ch_Lobby_Senate and Ch_Lobby_House), while they decrease lobbying expenditures toward 
 
17 These observations are generally consistent with the evidence in Correia (2014). 
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the SEC (DOJ) [SEC revolving door lobbyists] by 4 (4) [6] percent. I do not observe the change 
in lobbying expenditures made to CBO among lobbying firms undergoing an investigation. Of 
five lobbying issue area codes examined in my analyses, I find that lobbying expenditures on 
taxation issues (Ch_Lobby_Tax) and finance issues (Ch_Lobby_Fin) display an increase by 8 
percent and 1 percent, respectively, in the following year, whereas lobbying on other issues show 
negative or no change in expenditures in the subsequent year.  
An investigation spans on average 2.84 years until enforcement staff closes the case 
(untabulated statistic). Thus, I turn to the change in lobbying expenditures for two years ahead 
after the SEC opens an investigation, lobbying firms increase lobbying expenditures by 29 
percent (Ch_Lobby_2yr), a 10 percentage point higher relative to one-year change in lobbying 
expenditures (Ch_Lobby). I find that lobbying expenditures toward the Senate and House of 
Representatives increase by 31 percent and 29 percent, respectively, while lobbying expenditures 
toward the SEC (DOJ) [SEC revolving door lobbyists] decrease by 3 (4) [3] percent, respectively. 
With respect to lobbying issues, I observe an increase in expenditures of 3 percent, 11 percent, 
and 4 percent for finance/securities (Ch_Lobby_Fin_2yr), taxation (Ch_Lobby_Tax_2yr), and 
budgeting/appropriations issues (Ch_Lobby_Bud_2yr), respectively. However, lobbying firms 
decrease lobbying expenditures on tort issue by 2 percent. 
Next, I compare the characteristics of lobbying (Lobby_3yr= 1) and non-lobbying 
(Lobby_3yr= 0) firm-year observations (Table 3, Panel B). I note that lobbying firms are larger 
(Size), undervalued (BM), older (Age), and have lower debt obligations (Leverage). They are 
more likely to be listed in S&P 500 index (SP500), are followed by more analysts who report 
quarterly EPS estimates (Analysts), and display lower discretionary accruals (DACC). The 
distance measure indicates that lobbying firms and non-lobbying peers are located at a similar 
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distance from SEC offices. Using a machine learning approach, I find that lobbying firms score 
higher for fraud risk (Fraud_score). 
 
5.2. The relation between corporate lobbying activities and an SEC investigation 
I test whether firms engaging in lobbying activities are less likely to undergo an SEC 
investigation (Hypothesis 1) using Equation (1). Table 4 presents regression results. Contrary to 
the prediction following the regulatory capture, the estimated coefficients on Lobby_3yr and 
Lobby_1yr are not statistically significant after controlling for firm characteristics associated 
with the SEC enforcement. However, the estimated coefficient on Lobby_3yr is marginally 
positive when I do not control for Fraud_score. The result suggests that fraud risk is a 
confounding factor to the relationship between lobbying activities and an SEC investigation. 
Overall, I do not find that either long-term or short-term lobbying activities are associated with 
the staff’ investigation decision. To address correlated omitted variable concern, I re-estimate 
equation (1) using firm fixed effects in place of the industry fixed effects using an OLS. The 
analysis yields results consistent to those in the main model, offering additional support for my 
inferences (untabulated). 
To address how different lobbying channels influence the decision on investigation 
targets, I analyze lobbying activities by lobbying contacts disclosed in the reports. For five out of 
six specifications, the estimated coefficients on the treatment variables are not statistically 
significant (Table 5). For lobbying issue area codes, I find that the estimated coefficients on 
Lobby_Fin and Lobby_Bud are positive and statistically significant (Table 6). 
 
5.3.The relation between corporate lobbying efforts and an SEC enforcement action 
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In this section, I test whether commissioners are less likely to approve an enforcement 
action against a firm that engages in reactive lobbying efforts during an investigation. Table 7, 
Panel A presents regression results from estimating equation (2). Consistent with predictions 
following regulatory capture, the estimated coefficient on Ch_Lobby is significantly and 
negatively associated with the incident of an AAER, suggesting that a firm’s reactive lobbying 
efforts by increasing lobbying expenditures subsequent to an SEC investigation lead to a lower 
likelihood of an enforcement action.   
In terms of economic significance, the marginal effect of Ch_Lobby in the fully specified 
model is -0.0321 (untabulated). The estimated coefficient and sample statistics imply that one 
standard deviation increase in the percent change of lobbying expenditures corresponds to a 19.3 
percent lower likelihood of an AAER issuance, relative to the unconditional probability of 
receiving an AAER in my sample (-0.0321*0.9113/0.1517 = -0.193).  
I then consider reactive lobbying efforts based on lobbying contacts to understand how 
direct and indirect lobbying efforts influence an enforcement decision. Table 7, Panel A presents 
that only indirect lobbying channels (i.e., lobbying toward the Senate and House of 
Representatives) are negatively associated with the likelihood of an AAER. In terms of economic 
significance, one standard deviation increase in the percent change of lobbying expenditures 
toward the Senate (House of Representatives) corresponds to a 16.8 (22.1) percent lower 
likelihood of an AAER issuance. 
Next, I investigate how a firm’s political ties to SEC-relevant committees are related to 
enforcement decision. Table 7, Panel B presents the results. Column 2 shows that the change in 
tax-related lobbying expenditures (Ch_Lobby_Tax) is negatively associated with the likelihood 
of an AAER issuance. As a falsification test, I repeat the analysis focusing on torts issue (column 
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5). Consistent with my expectations, the estimated coefficient for Ch_Lobby_Tor is 
economically and statistically insignificant. 
As an SEC investigation lasts for 2.8 years on average, I re-estimate equation (2), 
substituting Ch_Lobby with variables indicating the percent change in lobbing expenditures for 
two years ahead after the SEC opens an investigation. Table 8, Panel A presents that 
Ch_Lobby_2yr is negatively associated with an incident of an AAER. In terms of economic 
significance, the marginal effect of Ch_Lobby_2yr in the fully specified model is -0.0334 
(untabulated). This indicates that one standard deviation increase in the percent change of 
lobbying expenditures for two-years ahead during an SEC investigation corresponds to a 22.7 
percent lower likelihood of an AAER issuance (-0.0334*1.0290/0.1517= -0.227). 
With respect to direct and indirect lobbying channels, the results are generally consistent 
with those in Table 7, Panel A. Lobbying efforts via the indirect channel for two-years are 
negatively and significantly related to an AAER issuance. Economically, one standard deviation 
increase in the percent change of lobbying expenditures toward the Senate (House of 
Representatives) for two years corresponds to a 18 (25.9) percent lower likelihood of an AAER 
issuance. Interestingly, I find firms that increase lobbying expenditures directly toward the SEC 
for two years are more likely to receive an AAER after an investigation.  
In Panel B, I re-estimate the analyses using lobbying issue area codes with two-year 
percent change. The results are consistent with those in Table 7, Panel B. the estimated 
coefficient for Ch_Lobby_Tax_2yr is negatively associated with an incident of an AAER. 
Collectively, the evidence supports that regulatory capture through reactive lobbying efforts 
occurs at the SEC’s commissioner level.  
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5.4. Robustness Tests and Additional Analyses 
5.4.1. Instrumental variable on SEC investigation analyses 
To address the endogeneity of corporate lobbying activities in Hypothesis 1, I run probit 
regressions with an instrumental variable. Specifically, I use the firm-level political risk as an 
instrument. Hassan et al. (2019) construct the measure using a computational linguistics 
approach by reading conference calls on eight topics related to economic policy, environment, 
health care, security & defense, tax policy, technology & infrastructure, institutions, and trade. 
Their paper documents that firms with high political risk are more likely to actively lobby and 
donate to politicians.  
I find that a firm’s political risk is strongly associated with proactive lobbying activities. 
In the first stage regression of political risk (PRisk) on all explanatory variables (Table 9, column 
1), the partial F-statistic of PRisk is 209.99. This value indicates that a firm’s political risk is 
highly correlated with the firm’s tendency to engage in lobbying activities but is unlikely to be 
associated with the staff’ investigation decision. In column 2, the IV probit regression does not 
show a statistical relation between proactive lobbying activities and the probability of an SEC 
investigation. 
5.4.2. Entropy balancing 
My main analyses use a pooled sample of both lobbying and non-lobbying firms. A 
potential concern is that the two group of firms are systematically different. I consider entropy 
balancing approach to address the concern. I construct an entropy-balanced sample using a 
vector of determinants prior studies links to the SEC enforcement, as well as residual macro and 
micro factors through industry and year matches. These variables mirror the control variables I 
use in Equations (1) and (2). 
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Entropy balancing employs a weighting algorithm that “involve[s] exact balance on the 
first, second, and possibly higher moments of the covariate distributions in the treatment and the 
reweighted control sample” (Hainmueller, 2012).18 I set balance constraints for the covariates at 
one and the minimum degree for convergence (i.e., tolerance) at 0.015. I present the balance of 
covariates in Table 10, Panel A. I observe the vector of controls with standardized differences 
and variance ratios are comparable between lobbying and non-lobbying firms, indicating that the 
balancing procedure is effective. Re-estimating the equations using the entropy-balanced sample, 
I find the estimated coefficients on Lobby_3yr, Lobby_Contact, and Lobby_Issue are generally 
consistent with my main results (Table 10, Panel B). 
5.4.3. The relation between a firm’s fraud level and lobbying decision 
Ex ante, it is unclear whether a firm’ lobbying decision is correlated with the firm’s fraud 
risk. Hill et al. (2013) discuss the factors that can incentivize a manager to seek political 
connections, one of them being value enhancing. Corporate lobbying should benefit a firm’s 
value through increasing revenues or, most notably, decreasing firm risk. Similarly, Brown et al. 
(2006) argue that firms with higher litigation risk and regulatory oversight have incentives to 
acquire political connections.  
If a firm has fraudulent intent (e.g., illegal insider trading or financial misreporting), the 
firm may have strong motives to organize political activities with a goal of circumventing or 
evading regulatory interventions. In this case, the decision to conduct lobbying activities reflects 
lobbying firms’ broader strategy to manage enforcement risk. Thus, I posit that firms committing 
misdemeanors and violations of securities laws may increase lobbying expenditures lest they 
 
18 McMullin and Schonberger (2019) find that entropy balancing (EB) is superior to other matching schemes (OLS 
or propensity score matching) in that EB equalizes higher-order moments of covariate distribution between 
treatment and control groups and minimizes both type I and type II errors. In addition, EB requires less researcher 
discretion unlike PSM.  
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spur potential SEC investigations. I implement the analysis using the following model: 
Lobby_up i,t = a0 + a1 Fraud_score i,t  + a2 Size i,t  + a3 BM i,t + a4 Leverage i,t + a5 CF i,t + a6 
R&D i,t + a7 HHI i,t + Year_FE + Industry_FE + ε 
(3) 
The dependent variable in equations (3) is Lobby_up, an indicator variable set to one if a 
firm increases lobbying expenditures from year t to year t+1, and zero otherwise. If firms have a 
broader tendency to commit financial misconduct that can trigger an SEC investigation, the firms 
will allocate more resources on lobbying to seek political protection. I expect a positive and 
significant estimated coefficient on Fraud_score, (i.e., a1 > 0), consistent with a higher 
likelihood of increasing corporate lobbying activities to evade regulatory intervention. The 
vector of controls follows prior research on the determinants of corporate lobbying (Hill et al. 
2013) for equation (3).  
As shown in Table 11, firms with high predicted fraud scores are more likely to increase 
lobbying expenditures in subsequent periods. In terms of economic significance, the marginal 
effect of Fraud_score implies that one standard deviation increase in a firm’s predicted fraud 
score corresponds to a 5.1 percent higher likelihood of increasing lobbying expenditures in the 
next period relative to the sample mean (untabulated).  
5.4.4. Administrative proceedings vs. Civil Litigation as a proxy for SEC commissioners’ 
enforcement decision 
In the main analyses, I use AAERs as a proxy for SEC commissioners’ enforcement 
decision. However, it is possible that there are cases in which commissioners are compelled to 
impose sanctions on politically connected firms whose malfeasance is too evident and too salient 
(i.e., garnering more media attention). Failure to exercise its authority to charge penalties on 
those firms will raise the public’s concern about the integrity of the SEC. Then, the question 
becomes whether SEC commissioners have alternative means to provide preferential treatment to 
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lobbying firms, should there be an enforcement action. To address the question, I offer another 
proxy for commissioners’ enforcement discretion: (1) the decision to institute administrative 
proceedings (APs) before an administrative law judge and (2) the decision to litigate in federal 
court. Referred to as prosecutorial decision, commissioners’ enforcement discretion can entail 
the type of enforcement forum.  
The type of forum through which the SEC brings enforcement actions is an interesting 
question. The director of Division of Enforcement, Andrew Ceresney, announced in 2014 that 
the SEC will bring more APs after the Dodd-Frank Act, as the statutory change expanded the 
SEC’s authority, allowing it to enforce regulations against unregistered firms and individuals. 
Wall Street Journal (WSJ) analyzed the outcomes of the SEC’s expanded jurisdiction based on 
the type of forum and reported that defendants are more likely to lose when the SEC litigated 
them in the APs than when the SEC litigated them in federal court (WSJ, 2014). The article 
argued that the administrative law judges are biased in favor of the SEC, one that is referred to as 
taking advantage of a “home court.” In academic literature, Velikonja (2018) finds that the study 
design by WSJ is misleading and that the SEC is less likely to win in cases sued for insider 
trading and accounting fraud. Choi and Pritchard (2017) report an increase of APs cases and a 
decrease of litigations in court after the Dodd-Frank Act.  
Although these questions are very important, a comprehensive examination is beyond the 
score of the paper. Nevertheless, I provide a preliminary analysis by investigating which 
prosecutorial forum the SEC is more likely to take against lobbying firms. Specifically, I 
evaluate the likelihood that firms engaging in reactive lobbying efforts during an investigation 
are more likely to be litigated in APs relative to in federal court. 
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Table 12 presents the results. In my sample, the SEC brings either APs only or both APs 
and civil litigations against firms after an investigation. I re-estimate equation (2), substituting 
SEC_Enforcement with AP_Civil, an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the SEC litigates a firm 
in both APs and federal court, and 0 if the SEC brings only APs. I find a negative relation 
between the change in lobbying expenditures toward the SEC and AP_Civil, suggesting that 
firms engaging in lobbying efforts toward the SEC directly are more likely to settle an 
enforcement case through APs only. 
5.4.5. Political affiliation of SEC commissioners 
Prior law literature posits that judges’ political affiliation plays an important role in 
predicting lawsuit outcomes (Choi et al. 2015, Epstein et al. 2015). Liberal judges are associated 
with higher litigation risks to firms than conservative judges. Huang et al. (2019) find that firms 
headquartered in liberal circuits face a higher likelihood of being sued in class action than those 
in conservative circuits. Similarly, Republican-leaning judges are inclined to rule in favor of 
business and corporations (Kang and Shepherd 2015). 
SEC commissioners are political appointees by the President and Congress with 
staggered, five-year terms. Governed by administrative law doctrine, the SEC possess the 
executive power to administer law enforcement. If federal judges’ political characteristics can 
affect judicial decision-making and lawsuit outcomes, it is possible that commissioners’ political 
affiliation is also associated with the SEC oversight enforcement. Following the same notion, I 
expect that Republican-leaning (Democratic-leaning) panel of SEC commissioners are less (more) 
like to authorize an enforcement action against firms. 
I first measure the political affiliation for the panel of commissioners each year (SEC_PA) 
by adding together an indicator set to 1 (0) [-1] if the commissioner is identified as Democrat 
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(Independent) [Republican]. Then, I re-estimate equation (2) by including SEC_PA as an 
additional explanatory variable. The results find that the estimated coefficients for the change in 
lobbying expenditures around an SEC investigation remain statistically significant (Table 13). In 
addition, I observe statistically significant positive associations between SEC_PA and AAER 
across all specifications, suggesting that Democratic-learning panel of SEC commissioners are 
more likely to approve an enforcement action subsequence to an investigation.  
5.4.6. Meetings between SEC Chair and firms under investigation 
Zheng et al. (2019) present another venue of facilitating regulatory capture through 
meetings with SEC Chair. They argue that politically connected firms or firms under SEC 
investigations seek out closed-door meetings with SEC Chair as a source of negotiating for and 
obtaining regulatory favors. They find that firms meeting with SEC Chair receive lower 
monetary penalties. Similarly, it is also possible that a firm under a formal investigation may ask 
politicians representing the state where the firm is headquartered in to speak favorably to SEC 
Chair on behalf of the firm.  
As such, I include an indicator variable (Chair_Firm_Meet) set to 1 if SEC Chair is 
scheduled to have a meeting with a firm during a formal investigation. Then I re-estimate 
equation (2) by including Chair_Firm_Meet as an additional explanatory variable. In addition, I 
re-run equation (2) by including another indicator variable (Chair_Congress_Meet) set to 1 if 
SEC Chair meets members of Congress representing the state where a firm is headquartered in 
during an investigation. I find consistent, robust results across different specifications, suggesting 










My analyses are rooted in the tension between political incentives and career incentives 
at the SEC. The implication of the misalignment between the two incentives is that the SEC 
mitigates political influence from its overseers while satisfying the duty to protect investors. 
Distinguishing between enforcement staff’ investigation decision and commissioners’ 
enforcement decision, I offer two key inferences. First, the preferential treatment deriving from 
corporate political investment materializes during the final stage in the SEC oversight 
enforcement when commissioners deliberate the case. Second, the staff exercise due diligence in 
their stringent investigative activities, targeting firms regardless of their political profile. 
Collectively, this study supports that the incentive misalignment between commissioner and 
enforcement staff helps the SEC achieve the conflicting objectives.  
In addition, this paper is the first to empirically measure and analyze two different types 
of lobbying engagement: proactive lobbying activities and reactive lobbying efforts. I present 
evidence suggesting that reactive lobbying efforts upon the opening of an SEC investigation are 
effective in mitigating enforcement risk, whereas proactive lobbying activities do not necessarily 
generate regulatory favor for politically connected firms. 
Despite extensive tests, there are some caveats. First, I note that the scope of my analyses 
is limited by the fact that lobbying reports never explicitly make references to an active SEC 
investigation. As a matter of fact, lobbying in exchange for enforcement leniency may constitute 
violations of federal bribery and corruptions statutes. My research design, however, offers a 
unique setting to empirically evaluate the efficacy of corporate lobbying on the SEC enforcement. 
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Other sources of concern are also present. For example, there are confounding factors 
associated with a firm’s choice to engage in lobbying such as an introduction of new bills and 
lobbying activities conducted by peer firms (Hill et al. 2013). Many firms express their positions 
on specific bills introduced in Congress by means of lobbying. However, provided that the 
timing of SEC investigations is exogenous and that lobbying firms must file lobbying activities 
report every quarter once registered, my analyses are less likely to have concerns of sample 
selection bias.  
Endogeneity may also arise from firms’ willingness to cooperate during an investigation. 
Referred to as Enforcement Cooperation Initiative, the program encourages firms and individuals 
to cooperate with an investigation in exchange for reduced penalties. Files (2012) finds that firms 
cooperating with the SEC are less likely to receive sanctions and are rewarded with lower 
monetary penalties. It is possible that lobbying firms in my sample have received cooperation 
credit during an investigation, which can possibly lead to the lower likelihood of AAERs. 
Unfortunately, how comprehensively firms cooperate with an investigation and how the SEC 
weighs the degree of cooperation are not directly observable to firm outsiders. I relegate the 
thorough examination of the issue to future research. 
My findings inform a wide audience including market participants and practitioners. The 
evidence adds credence to the efficacy of the SEC’s investigations. SEC staff serve the public 
interest by diligently monitoring and investigating firms regardless of their political connections. 
My study also highlights the considerations during an enforcement process other than the merits 









Table 1. Variable definitions 
 
Variable Name Definition Data Source 
SEC_Investigation An indicator variable set to 1 if the SEC opens an investigation on a firm in year t+1, and 0 if 
the SEC does not open an investigation on the firm in year t+1. 
SEC Edgar 
AAER An indicator variable set to 1 if a firm receives an AAER during or within two years after a 
formal SEC investigation closes, and 0 if a firm does not receive an AAER during or within two 
years after a formal SEC investigation closes. 
SEC Edgar 
Lobby_3yr An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm contacts the Senate, the House of Representatives, 
the SEC, the DOJ, or Congressional Budget Office for lobbying activities at least once in years 
t, t-1, or t-2, and 0 otherwise. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Lobby_1yr An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm contacts the Senate, the House of Representatives, 




Lobby_Senate An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm contacts the Senate for lobbying activities at least 
once in years t, t-1, or t-2, and 0 otherwise. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Lobby_House An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm contacts the House of Representatives for lobbying 
activities at least once in years t, t-1, or t-2, and 0 otherwise. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Lobby_SEC An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm contacts the SEC for lobbying activities at least 
once in years t, t-1, or t-2, and 0 otherwise. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Lobby_DOJ An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm contacts the DOJ for lobbying activities at least 
once in years t, t-1, or t-2, and 0 otherwise. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Lobby_Budget An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm contacts the Congressional Budget Office for 
lobbying activities at least once in years t, t-1, or t-2, and 0 otherwise. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Lobby_Revolving An indicator variable taking a value of one if lobbying activities involved SEC revolving door 
lobbyists at least once in years t, t-1, and t-2, and 0 otherwise 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Lobby_Fin An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm conducts lobbying activities on financial 
institutions/securities issues at least once in years t, t-1, or t-2, and 0 otherwise. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Lobby_Tax An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm conducts lobbying activities on taxation/internal 








Lobby_Acc An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm conducts lobbying activities on accounting 
issues at least once in years t, t-1, or t-2, and 0 otherwise. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Lobby_Bud An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm conducts lobbying activities on 
budget/appropriations issues at least once in years t, t-1, or t-2, and 0 otherwise. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Lobby_Tor An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm conducts lobbying activities on torts issues at least 
once in years t, t-1, or t-2, and 0 otherwise. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby The percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures from year t when the SEC opens 
an investigation to year t+1. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_Senate The percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures toward the Senate from year t 
when the SEC opens an investigation to year t+1. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_House The percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures toward the House of 
Representatives from year t when the SEC opens an investigation to year t+1. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_SEC The percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures toward the SEC from year t when 
the SEC opens an investigation to year t+1. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_DOJ The percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures toward the DOJ from year t when 
the SEC opens an investigation to year t+1. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_Budget The percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures toward the Congressional Budget 
Office from year t when the SEC opens an investigation to year t+1. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_Revolving The percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures using SEC revolving door 
lobbyists from year t when the SEC opens an investigation to year t+1. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_Fin The percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures on issues related to financial 
institutions/securities from year t when the SEC opens an investigation to year t+1. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_Tax The percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures on issues related to 




Ch_Lobby_Acc The percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures on issues related to accounting 








Ch_Lobby_Bud The percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures on issues related to 
budget/appropriations from year t when the SEC opens an investigation to year t+1. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_Tor The percent change in a firm’s lobbying expenditures on issues related to torts from 
year t when the SEC opens an investigation to year t+1. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_2yr The percent change from a firm’s lobbying expenditure in year t when the SEC opens 
an investigation to the firm’s average lobbying expenditures in years t+1 and t+2. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_Senate_2yr The percent change from a firm’s lobbying expenditures toward the Senate in year t 
when the SEC opens an investigation to the firm’s average lobbying expenditures 
toward the Senate in years t+1 and t+2. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_House_2yr The percent change from a firm’s lobbying expenditures toward the House of 
Representatives in year t when the SEC opens an investigation to the firm’s average 
lobbying expenditures toward the House of Representatives in years t+1 and t+2. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_SEC_2yr The percent change from a firm’s lobbying expenditures toward the SEC in year t when 
the SEC opens an investigation to the firm’s average lobbying expenditures toward the 
SEC in years t+1 and t+2. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_DOJ_2yr The percent change from a firm’s lobbying expenditures toward the DOJ in year t when 
the SEC opens an investigation to the firm’s average lobbying expenditures toward the 
DOJ in years t+1 and t+2. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_Budget_2yr The percent change from a firm’s lobbying expenditures toward the Congressional 
Budget Office in year t when the SEC opens an investigation to the firm’s average 
lobbying expenditures toward the Congressional Budget Office in years t+1 and t+2. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_Revolving_2yr The percent change from a firm’s lobbying expenditures using SEC revolving door 
lobbyists in year t when the SEC opens an investigation to the firm’s average lobbying 
expenditures using SEC revolving door lobbyists in years t+1 and t+2. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_Fin_2yr The percent change from a firm’s lobbying expenditures on issues related to financial 
institutions/securities in year t when the SEC opens an investigation to the firm’s 








Ch_Lobby_Tax_2yr The percent change from a firm’s lobbying expenditures on issues related to 
taxation/internal revenue code in year t when the SEC opens an investigation to the 
firm’s average lobbying expenditures for the same issue code in years t+1 and t+2. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_Acc_2yr The percent change from a firm’s lobbying expenditures on issues related to accounting 
in year t when the SEC opens an investigation to the firm’s average lobbying 
expenditures for the same issue code in years t+1 and t+2. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_Bud_2yr The percent change from a firm’s lobbying expenditures on issues related to 
budget/appropriations in year t when the SEC opens an investigation to the firm’s 
average lobbying expenditures for the same issue code in years t+1 and t+2. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Ch_Lobby_Tor_2yr The percent change from a firm’s lobbying expenditures on issues related to torts in 
year t when the SEC opens an investigation to the firm’s average lobbying expenditures 
for the same issue code in years t+1 and t+2. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Lobby_up An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm increases lobbying expenditures from year t 
to year t+1, and 0 otherwise. 
CRP and 
LobbyView 
Size The natural logarithm of a firm's market capitalization. Compustat 
BM Book to market ratio (CEQ/PRCC_f*CSHO). Compustat 
Leverage The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets 
((DLTT+DLC/AT). 
Compustat 
Age The number of years from the first date in which a firm appears in Compustat. Compustat 
SP500 An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm is one of the S&P 500 constituents, and 0 
otherwise. 
Compustat 
Analysts The number of analysts issuing quarterly EPS forecasts during the fiscal year. IBES 
DACC Performance matched discretionary accruals. See Kothari et al. (2005). Compustat 
Distance The natural logarithm of a distance between a firm’s headquarter office and the closest SEC 









Fraud_score An accounting fraud prediction metric using machine learning approach Bao et al. 
(2019) 
CF Operating income before depreciation net of interest expense, income taxes, and common 
dividends, scaled by total assets ((OIBDP-XINT-TXT-DVC)/AT). 
Compustat 
R&D The ratio of research and development expenditures to revenues (XRD/REVT).  Compustat 
HHI Hirschmann-Herfindahl index, calculated at the two-digit SIC level.  
SEC_PA The sum of SEC commissioner’s political affiliation indicator set to 1 (0) [-1] if the 
commissioner is identified as Democrat (Independent) [Republican]. 
SEC 
PRisk The standardized average of the transcript-based scores of political risk for a given firm and 
year 





















Table 2. Sample selection and distribution by year 
Panel A. Sample selection        





Firm-years with matching Compustat, lobbying reports, SEC investigations 1998-2018 
excluding non-U.S.firms 
 217,317   217,317  
 Less firm-years with missing variables  (80,642)   
 Less firm-years with observations in years <1999  (31,917)   
 Less firm-years with missing machine-learning Fraud_score  (33,270)   
Final sample for SEC investigation analyses  71,488    
 Less firm-years with no lobbying activities  (62,936)   
 Less firm-years with no industry variation for logit analyses  (97)   
Final sample for SEC investigation analyses using a subsample of lobbying firms  8,445    
 Less firm-years without SEC investigations    (213,642) 
 Less firm-years with missing variables     (265) 
 Less firm-years with observations in years <1999    (198) 
 Less firm-years with no lobbying activities    (2,132) 
 Less firm-years with no industry variation for logit analyses    (98) 













Panel B. Distribution of firms by year 
Year 
Firms with sufficient 
data 
Firms lobbying at 
least once in years 
t, t-1, or t-2 
Proportion of  
lobbying firms 
Firms investigated by 
the SEC in year t+1 
Proportion of firms 
investigated by the 
SEC in year t+1 
1999 5,437 455 8.37% 118 2.17% 
2000 5,240 462 8.82% 89 1.70% 
2001 4,830 523 10.83% 95 1.97% 
2002 4,524 562 12.42% 259 5.73% 
2003 4,387 614 14.00% 220 5.01% 
2004 4,332 654 15.10% 261 6.02% 
2005 4,146 702 16.93% 271 6.54% 
2006 4,066 750 18.45% 160 3.94% 
2007 3,988 736 18.46% 158 3.96% 
2008 3,755 711 18.93% 129 3.44% 
2009 3,553 753 21.19% 154 4.33% 
2010 3,477 729 20.97% 111 3.19% 
2011 3,420 690 20.18% 126 3.68% 
2012 3,385 659 19.47% 118 3.49% 
2013 3,412 641 18.79% 98 2.87% 
2014 3,463 621 17.93% 65 1.88% 
2015 3,111 594 19.09% 55 1.77% 
2016 2,962 523 17.66% 4 0.14% 









Panel C. Distribution of firms by industry 
  Firms with sufficient data 
Firms lobbied in  
years t, t-1, or t-2 Proportion of lobbying firms 
Business Services 9,935 1,030 10.37% 
Utilities 1,788 934 52.24% 
Pharmaceutical Product 6,324 846 13.38% 
Communication 2,446 660 26.98% 
Electronic Equipment 4,447 582 13.09% 
Transportation 1,642 515 31.36% 
Chemicals 1,599 468 29.27% 
Petroleum and Natural 3,464 467 13.48% 
Medical Equipment 2,975 463 15.56% 
Retail 3,405 454 13.33% 
Others 33,463 4,960 14.82% 












Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for a pool sample 
Variable N Mean SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
SEC_Investigation 71,488 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Lobby_3yr 71,488 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Lobby_1yr 71,488 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Lobby_Senate 8,455 0.98 0.15 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Lobby_House 8,455 0.98 0.15 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Lobby_SEC 8,455 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Lobby_DOJ 8,455 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Lobby_Budget 8,455 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Lobby_Revolving 8,455 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Lobby_Fin 8,455 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Lobby_Tax 8,455 0.51 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Lobby_Acc 8,455 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Lobby_Bud 8,455 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Lobby_Tor 8,455 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Size 71,488 4.95 2.62 -1.13 3.06 4.99 6.86 10.78 
BM 71,488 0.26 1.85 -11.75 0.13 0.38 0.73 4.45 
Leverage 71,488 0.43 1.01 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.41 7.16 
Age 71,488 15.86 12.44 0.00 6.00 13.00 22.00 55.00 
SP500 71,488 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Analysts 71,488 4.60 7.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.00 64.00 
DACC 71,488 0.00 0.06 -0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.07 
Distance 71,488 4.36 2.07 -0.78 3.39 4.31 5.94 9.16 
Fraud_score 71,488 4.10 1.26 1.11 3.09 4.08 5.04 8.93 
AAER 982 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Ch_Lobby 982 0.19 0.91 -1.00 -0.14 0.00 0.23 6.00 
Ch_Lobby_Senate 982 0.20 0.93 -1.00 -0.19 0.00 0.25 6.16 
Ch_Lobby_House 982 0.20 0.92 -1.00 -0.18 0.00 0.29 6.00 
Ch_Lobby_SEC 982 -0.04 0.19 -0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 
Ch_Lobby_DOJ 982 -0.04 0.21 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 
Ch_Lobby_Budget 982 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ch_Lobby_Revolving 982 -0.06 0.27 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 
Ch_Lobby_Fin 982 0.01 0.37 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.37 
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Ch_Lobby_Tax 982 0.08 0.63 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 3.72 
Ch_Lobby_Acc 982 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ch_Lobby_Bud 982 -0.01 0.53 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 
Ch_Lobby_Tor 982 -0.02 0.13 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 
Ch_Lobby_2yr 982 0.29 1.03 -0.90 -0.11 0.00 0.31 7.25 
Ch_Lobby_Senate_2yr 982 0.31 1.07 -0.90 -0.13 0.00 0.39 7.72 
Ch_Lobby_House_2yr 982 0.29 1.02 -0.90 -0.13 0.00 0.34 7.25 
Ch_Lobby_SEC_2yr 982 -0.03 0.14 -0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
Ch_Lobby_DOJ_2yr 982 -0.04 0.20 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 
Ch_Lobby_Budget_2yr 982 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ch_Lobby_Revolving_2yr 906 -0.03 0.22 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 
Ch_Lobby_Fin_2yr 982 0.03 0.39 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.46 
Ch_Lobby_Tax_2yr 982 0.11 0.67 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 4.44 
Ch_Lobby_Acc_2yr 982 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ch_Lobby_Bud_2yr 982 0.04 0.63 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.64 
Ch_Lobby_Tor_2yr 982 -0.02 0.12 -0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 
 
 
Panel B. Sample partitioned on Lobby_3yr 
 (1) Lobby_3yr=0  (2) Lobby_3yr=1  Test of Differences (1)-(2) 
Variable N  Mean  N  Mean  Difference  t-stat 
Size   60,109   4.435    11,379   7.644  -3.209***  -130.00 
BM   60,109   0.242    11,379   0.338  -0.095***  -5.04 
Leverage   60,109   0.455    11,379   0.295  0.160***  15.40 
Age   60,109   14.054    11,379   25.374  -11.320***  -94.37 
SP500   60,109   0.029    11,379   0.368  -0.339***  -130.00 
Analysts   60,109   3.376    11,379   11.052  -7.676***  -110.00 
DACC   60,109   0.000    11,379   -0.002  0.002***  3.00 
Distance   60,109   4.368    11,379   4.346  0.022  1.03 











Panel C. Pearson correlation matrix (Investigation Analysis) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
(1) SEC_Investigation 1.00                      
(2) Lobby_3yr 0.06 1.00                     
(3) Lobby_Senate 0.01 0.96 1.00                    
(4) Lobby_House 0.01 0.96 0.92 1.00                   
(5) Lobby_SEC 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 1.00                  
(6) Lobby_DOJ 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.11 1.00                 
(7) Lobby_Budget 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.07 1.00                
(8) Lobby_Revolving 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.06 1.00               
(9) Lobby_Fin 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.36 0.16 0.03 0.14 1.00              
(10) Lobby_Tax 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.04 0.15 0.31 1.00             
(11) Lobby_Acc 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.18 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.13 1.00            
(12) Lobby_Bud 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.06 0.17 0.20 0.28 0.08 1.00           
(13) Lobby_Tor 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.13 1.00          
(14) Size 0.11 0.45 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.06 0.19 0.30 0.50 0.11 0.23 0.18 1.00         
(15) BM 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.20 1.00        
(16) Leverage -0.03 -0.06 -0.12 -0.11 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.27 -0.39 1.00       
(17) Age 0.01 0.33 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.22 0.38 0.05 0.22 0.14 0.35 0.05 -0.09 1.00      
(18) SP500 0.08 0.45 0.09 0.08 0.19 0.19 0.06 0.18 0.31 0.49 0.13 0.26 0.19 0.50 0.02 -0.05 0.38 1.00     
(19) Analysts 0.09 0.37 0.09 0.08 0.18 0.12 0.05 0.13 0.20 0.33 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.65 0.06 -0.11 0.25 0.54 1.00    
(20) DACC 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 1.00   
(21) Distance 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.09 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 1.00  
(22) Fraud_score 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.42 0.03 -0.05 0.18 0.19 0.33 0.33 0.00 1.00 
 
This table presents Pearson correlations for SEC investigation analysis sample. Correlations statistically significant at 1% level are highlighted in 










Panel D. Pearson correlation matrix (Enforcement Analysis) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(1) AAER 
1.00                     
(2) Ch_Lobby 
-0.04 1.00                    
(3) Ch_Lobby_Senate 
-0.04 0.90 1.00                   
(4) Ch_Lobby_House 
-0.06 0.88 0.94 1.00                  
(5) Ch_Lobby_SEC 
-0.01 0.09 0.05 0.04 1.00                 
(6) Ch_Lobby_DOJ 
-0.02 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 1.00                
(7) Ch_Lobby_Budget 
. . . . . . .                
(8) Ch_Lobby_Revolving 
-0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 -0.03 0.15 .  1.00              
(9) Ch_Lobby_Fin 
0.05 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.05 .  0.02 1.00             
(10) Ch_Lobby_Tax 
-0.04 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.09 -0.04 .  0.03 0.11 1.00            
(11) Ch_Lobby_Acc 
. . . . . . .  . . . .            
(12) Ch_Lobby_Bud 
-0.02 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.03 .  0.02 -0.09 0.07 . 1.00          
(13) Ch_Lobby_Tor 
-0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.05 .  0.08 0.00 0.07 . 0.03 1.00         
(14) Size 
0.07 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.14 -0.14 .  -0.13 0.03 0.09 . 0.00 -0.07 1.00        
(15) BM 
0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 .  -0.04 0.02 0.03 . 0.01 -0.01 0.23 1.00       
(16) Leverage 
0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.00 .  -0.06 0.05 -0.03 . -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 1.00      
(17) Age 
0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.14 -0.06 .  -0.04 0.01 0.04 . 0.01 -0.08 0.43 0.04 0.05 1.00     
(18) SP500 
0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.10 -0.13 .  -0.15 -0.01 0.08 . 0.00 -0.05 0.66 0.15 0.00 0.41 1.00    
(19) Analysts 
-0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 .  -0.07 0.01 0.04 . 0.03 -0.02 0.60 0.15 -0.13 0.17 0.46 1.00   
(20) DACC 
0.00 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 .  -0.02 0.08 0.02 . -0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.03 -0.03 1.00  
(21) Distance 
0.00 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 0.03 -0.06 .  0.02 -0.08 0.03 . -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 1.00 
 
This table presents Pearson correlations for SEC enforcement analysis sample. Correlations statistically significant at 1% level are highlighted in 
bold. I define all variables in Table 1. 
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Table 4. Effect of proactive lobbying on an SEC investigation 
            
 Dependent variable: SEC_Investigation 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lobby_3yr 0.797*** 0.112* 0.100   
 (15.215) (1.739) (1.542)   
Lobby_1yr    0.099 0.086 
    (1.502) (1.310) 
Size  0.288*** 0.259*** 0.289*** 0.260*** 
  (19.217) (16.389) (19.311) (16.467) 
BM  -0.064*** -0.062*** -0.064*** -0.062*** 
  (-3.505) (-3.467) (-3.511) (-3.472) 
Leverage  -0.030 -0.034 -0.030 -0.034 
  (-0.907) (-1.015) (-0.899) (-1.007) 
Age  -0.007*** -0.006** -0.007*** -0.006** 
  (-2.738) (-2.332) (-2.697) (-2.291) 
SP500  -0.064 -0.061 -0.061 -0.057 
  (-0.746) (-0.713) (-0.709) (-0.676) 
Analysts  0.008** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 
  (2.453) (2.535) (2.457) (2.539) 
DACC  0.764** 0.724** 0.763** 0.722** 
  (2.073) (1.979) (2.071) (1.977) 
Distance  0.393*** 0.394*** 0.393*** 0.394*** 
  (20.002) (20.129) (19.997) (20.125) 
Fraud_score   0.178***  0.178*** 
      (5.612)   (5.623) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 71,488 71,488 71,488 71,488 71,488 
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.137 0.138 0.137 0.138 
Regression type Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
 
The dependent variable is an indicator set to 1 if the SEC opens an investigation on a firm in year t+1, 
and 0 otherwise. I use a logit estimator for the models, clustering the standard errors by firm. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses below the coefficients. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. I define 





Table 5. Effect of proactive lobbying by lobbying contacts on an SEC investigation 
              
 Dependent variable: SEC_Investigation  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lobby_Senate 0.288      
 (0.689)      
Lobby_House  0.141     
  (0.318)     
Lobby_SEC   0.303    
   (1.428)    
Lobby_DOJ    0.229   
    (1.527)   
Lobby_Budget     0.137  
     (0.524)  
Lobby_Revolving      0.216* 
      (1.657) 
Size 0.205*** 0.206*** 0.205*** 0.198*** 0.206*** 0.201*** 
 (3.743) (3.778) (3.770) (3.649) (3.770) (3.708) 
BM -0.061 -0.062 -0.059 -0.061 -0.062 -0.063 
 (-1.371) (-1.385) (-1.367) (-1.406) (-1.403) (-1.429) 
Leverage 0.169 0.160 0.152 0.149 0.151 0.152 
 (1.247) (1.148) (1.140) (1.117) (1.125) (1.142) 
Age -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
 (-0.825) (-0.827) (-0.878) (-0.877) (-0.815) (-0.885) 
SP500 0.172 0.172 0.162 0.156 0.169 0.161 
 (1.118) (1.117) (1.053) (1.005) (1.100) (1.050) 
Analysts 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (1.382) (1.382) (1.253) (1.342) (1.403) (1.320) 
DACC 0.576 0.588 0.621 0.617 0.593 0.654 
 (0.526) (0.538) (0.572) (0.567) (0.543) (0.594) 
Distance 0.573*** 0.573*** 0.573*** 0.573*** 0.573*** 0.573*** 
 (9.640) (9.643) (9.664) (9.650) (9.644) (9.684) 
Fraud_score 0.242*** 0.243*** 0.248*** 0.241*** 0.243*** 0.239*** 
  (3.653) (3.663) (3.751) (3.611) (3.664) (3.593) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,455 8,455 8,455 8,455 8,455 8,455 
Pseudo R2 0.174 0.174 0.174 0.174 0.174 0.174 
 
I estimate the models within the subsample of firm-years with corporate lobbying activities, using a logit 
estimator with standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. I define all variables in Table 1.   
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Table 6. Effect of proactive lobbying by lobbying issues on an SEC investigation 
            
 Dependent variable: SEC_Investigation 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lobby_Fin 0.514***     
 (3.911)     
Lobby_Tax  -0.109    
  (-0.819)    
Lobby_Acc   -0.116   
   (-0.562)   
Lobby_Bud    0.227**  
    (1.979)  
Lobby_Tor     -0.153 
     (-0.922) 
Size 0.184*** 0.216*** 0.208*** 0.197*** 0.210*** 
 (3.366) (3.881) (3.785) (3.606) (3.836) 
BM -0.051 -0.066 -0.063 -0.059 -0.063 
 (-1.141) (-1.450) (-1.407) (-1.309) (-1.406) 
Leverage 0.128 0.152 0.150 0.159 0.148 
 (0.951) (1.131) (1.117) (1.196) (1.101) 
Age -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
 (-1.233) (-0.740) (-0.824) (-1.006) (-0.740) 
SP500 0.134 0.194 0.176 0.146 0.179 
 (0.868) (1.225) (1.144) (0.949) (1.157) 
Analysts 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008 
 (1.318) (1.420) (1.403) (1.431) (1.345) 
DACC 0.582 0.623 0.587 0.583 0.592 
 (0.534) (0.568) (0.538) (0.531) (0.542) 
Distance 0.574*** 0.572*** 0.573*** 0.572*** 0.573*** 
 (9.671) (9.642) (9.659) (9.667) (9.656) 
Fraud_score 0.251*** 0.242*** 0.244*** 0.249*** 0.243*** 
  (3.781) (3.647) (3.675) (3.727) (3.660) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,455 8,455 8,455 8,455 8,455 
Pseudo R2 0.178 0.174 0.174 0.175 0.174 
 
I estimate the models within the subsample of firm-years with corporate lobbying activities, using a logit 
estimator with standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. I define all variables in Table 1.   
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Table 7. Effect of reactive lobbying on an SEC enforcement action 
 
Panel A. One-year change in lobbying expenditures (and by lobbying contact) around SEC 
investigations 
 Dependent variable: AAER  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ch_Lobby -0.299**       
 (-2.284)       
Ch_Lobby_Senate  -0.255**      
  (-2.247)      
Ch_Lobby_House   
-
0.341*** 
    
   (-2.873)     
Ch_Lobby_SEC    0.348    
    (0.482)    
Ch_Lobby_DOJ     0.259   
     (0.879)   
Ch_Lobby_Budget      -  
        
Ch_Lobby_Revolving       -0.265 
              (-0.722) 
Size -0.053 -0.053 -0.053 -0.059 -0.060 -0.065 -0.068 
 (-0.546) (-0.547) (-0.546) (-0.607) (-0.617) (-0.678) (-0.698) 
BM 0.125 0.132 0.133 0.130 0.133 0.130 0.130 
 (0.752) (0.776) (0.758) -0.818 (0.824) (0.818) (0.810) 
Leverage 1.322** 1.297** 1.302** 1.242** 1.230** 1.219** 1.200** 
 (2.280) (2.240) (2.246) (2.046) (2.064) (2.055) (2.044) 
Age 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.027** 0.026** 0.026** 0.026** 
 (2.048) (2.040) (2.020) (2.192) (2.148) (2.161) (2.150) 
SP500 0.584* 0.600* 0.622* 0.623* 0.636** 0.628* 0.615* 
 (1.793) (1.853) (1.907) (1.955) (1.976) (1.956) (1.897) 
Analysts -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-0.371) (-0.390) (-0.407) (-0.433) (-0.404) (-0.381) (-0.404) 
DACC -1.628 -1.527 -1.356 -2.064 -1.893 -1.892 -1.974 
 (-0.659) (-0.609) (-0.538) (-0.786) (-0.754) (-0.755) (-0.781) 
Distance 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.014 0.018 0.016 0.015 
  (0.195) (0.159) (0.141) (0.315) (0.387) (0.340) (0.343) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 982 982 982 982 982 982 982 
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.174 0.177 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 
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Panel B. One-year change in lobbying expenditures by lobbying issues  
 Dependent variable: AAER 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ch_Lobby_Fin 0.031     
 (0.120)     
Ch_Lobby_Tax  -0.366**    
  (-2.167)    
Ch_Lobby_Acc   -   
      
Ch_Lobby_Bud    -0.038  
    (-0.182)  
Ch_Lobby_Tor     -0.827 
          (-1.426) 
Size -0.066 -0.050 -0.065 -0.066 -0.069 
 (-0.679) (-0.499) (-0.678) (-0.682) (-0.718) 
BM 0.129 0.148 0.130 0.130 0.128 
 (0.816) (0.799) (0.818) (0.817) (0.807) 
Leverage 1.215** 1.208** 1.219** 1.215** 1.186** 
 (2.052) (2.075) (2.055) (2.041) (2.002) 
Age 0.026** 0.027** 0.026** 0.026** 0.025** 
 (2.160) (2.245) (2.161) (2.161) (2.092) 
SP500 0.629* 0.604* 0.628* 0.628* 0.635** 
 (1.950) (1.908) (1.956) (1.955) (2.000) 
Analysts -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
 (-0.383) (-0.462) (-0.381) (-0.379) (-0.418) 
DACC -1.933 -1.631 -1.892 -1.923 -1.908 
 (-0.755) (-0.642) (-0.755) (-0.769) (-0.759) 
Distance 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 
  (0.355) (0.357) (0.340) (0.317) (0.317) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 982 982 982 982 982 
Pseudo R2 0.167 0.173 0.168 0.168 0.170 
 
The dependent variable is an indicator set to 1 if a firm receives an AAER during or within two years 
after a formal SEC investigation closes, and 0 otherwise. I estimate the models within the subsample of 
firm-years with corporate lobbying activities, using a logit estimator with standard errors clustered by 
firm. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% 







Table 8. Effect of longer-term reactive lobbying on an SEC enforcement action 
Panel A. two-year change in lobbying expenditures (and by lobbying contact) around SEC investigations 
 Dependent variable: AAER  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ch_Lobby_2yr -0.312**       
 (-2.420)       
Ch_Lobby_Senate_2yr  -0.237**      
  (-2.461)      
Ch_Lobby_House_2yr   -0.359***     
   (-3.028)     
Ch_Lobby_SEC_2yr    -0.805    
    (-1.190)    
Ch_Lobby_DOJ_2yr     0.149***   
     (2.716)   
Ch_Lobby_Budget_2yr      -  
        
Ch_Lobby_Revolving_2yr       -0.059 
              (-0.133) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
SE clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 982 982 982 982 982 982 902 








Panel B. two-year change in lobbying expenditures by lobbying issues  
 Dependent variable: AAER 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ch_Lobby_Fin_2yr -0.170     
 (-0.703)     
Ch_Lobby_Tax_2yr  -0.316*    
  (-1.934)    
Ch_Lobby_Acc_2yr   -   
      
Ch_Lobby_Bud_2yr    0.141  
    (0.930)  
Ch_Lobby_Tor_2yr     -1.217* 
          (-1.653) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 982 982 982 982 982 
Pseudo R2 0.168 0.172 0.168 0.169 0.172 
 
The dependent variable is an indicator set to 1 if a firm receives an AAER during or within two years after a formal SEC investigation closes, and 
0 otherwise. I estimate the models within the subsample of firm-years with corporate lobbying activities, using a Logit estimator with standard 
errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are presented in parentheses 





Table 9. IV probit analysis on an SEC investigation 
    
 (1) (2) 
 Stage 1 Two-step probit 
Variables Lobby_3yr SEC_Investigation 
Lobby_3yr  0.693 
  (1.60) 
PRisk 0.046***  
  (15.15)   
Control Variables Included Included 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 33,691 33,691 
Exogeneity test (p-value)  0.155 
Partial F-stat (instrument, stage 1) 209.99  
Regression type ivprobit 
 
The dependent variable is an indicator set to 1 if the SEC opens an investigation on a firm in year t+1, 
and 0 otherwise. I use two stage probit model with an instrumental variable (a firm level political risk). *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses below the coefficients. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. I define 























Table 10. Effect of corporate lobbying on an SEC investigation using entropy balancing 
 
Panel A. Covariate balance for entropy balanced sample partitioned on Lobby_3yr 
 Mean Standardized 
differences 
Variance Variance 
Ratios Variable Lobby_3yr=0 Lobby_3yr=1 Lobby_3yr=0 Lobby_3yr=1 
Size 7.643 7.644 -0.0005 3.854 4.346 1.128 
BM 0.337 0.338 -0.0002 0.659 1.791 2.719 
Leverage 0.295 0.295 0.0003 0.305 0.151 0.495 
Age 25.370 25.370 0.0000 220.100 235.000 1.068 
SP500 0.368 0.368 -0.0002 0.233 0.233 1.000 
Analysts 11.050 11.050 0.0000 106.300 118.600 1.116 
DACC -0.002 -0.002 0.0000 0.003 0.002 0.850 
Distance 4.346 4.346 0.0000 4.532 4.309 0.951 
Fraud_score 4.687 4.687 0.0000 1.609 1.511 0.939 
 
In this panel, I present the entropy-balanced-sample comparisons for lobbying and non-lobbying firms. I calculate the standard differences as the 
difference in means between the treatment and controlled samples, scaled by the standard deviation of the respective variable for the treatment 
sample for each covariate. The variance ratios use the treatment (control)sample standard deviation of the respective covariate as the numerator 















Panel B. Effect of corporate lobbying on SEC investigation using entropy balanced sample 
 Dependent variable: SEC_Investigation 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Lobby_3yr 0.051            
 (0.545)            
Lobby_Senate  1.063*           
  (1.698)           
Lobby_House   0.824          
   (1.257)          
Lobby_SEC    0.326         
    (1.543)         
Lobby_DOJ     0.245        
     (1.629)        
Lobby_Budget      0.138       
      (0.529)       
Lobby_Revolving       0.229*      
       (1.768)      
Lobby_Fin        
0.520**
* 
    
        (3.948)     
Lobby_Tax         -0.077    
         (-0.577)    
Lobby_Acc          -0.093   
          (-0.453)   
Lobby_Bud           0.245**  






Lobby_Tor            -0.136 
                        (-0.814) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
SE clustered by 
Firm 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 71,488 8,455 8,455 8,455 8,455 8,455 8,455 8,455 8,455 8,455 8,455 8,455 
Pseudo R2 0.143 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.174 0.178 0.174 0.174 0.175 0.174 
 
The vector of controls in panel B mirrors those in Table 4 (untabulated). I use a Logit estimator, clustering the standard errors by firm. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. I define all variables in Table 1. 
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Table 11. Strategic corporate lobbying and fraud risk 
        
 Dependent variable: Lobby_up 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Fraud_score 0.069** 0.016*** 0.020** 
 (2.260) (2.589) (2.329) 
Size 0.219*** 0.044*** 0.023*** 
 (14.949) (16.042) (2.985) 
BM -0.067*** -0.014*** -0.012*** 
 (-4.286) (-4.242) (-2.998) 
Leverage 0.177 0.030 0.051 
 (1.550) (1.534) (1.449) 
CF 0.226*** 0.032*** 0.022 
 (2.773) (3.025) (0.988) 
R&D 0.010 0.002 0.006 
 (0.508) (0.663) (0.960) 
HHI -1.922 -0.306 0.696 
  (-0.941) (-1.085) (0.872) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes No 
Firm FE No No Yes 
SE clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,415 10,855 10,855 
Pseudo R2/Adj R2 0.078 0.101 0.126 
Regression type Logit OLS OLS 
 
The dependent variable is an indicator set to 1 if a firm increases lobbying expenditures from year t to 
year t+1, and 0 otherwise. I estimate the models within the subsample of firm-years with corporate 
lobbying activities, using a Logit estimator with standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are presented in parentheses below 
the coefficients. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. I define all variables in Table 












Table 12. the SEC’s prosecutorial discretion and corporate lobbying 
 
 Dependent variable: AP_Civil 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ch_Lobby -0.038       
 (-0.104)       
Ch_Lobby_Senate  -0.142      
  (-0.240)      
Ch_Lobby_House   -0.226     
   (-0.336)     
Ch_Lobby_SEC    -2.136*    
    (-1.843)    
Ch_Lobby_DOJ     -4.031   
     (-1.222)   
Ch_Lobby_Budget      -  
        
Ch_Lobby_Revolving       1.358 
              (1.437) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 
Pseudo R2 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.373 0.368 0.354 0.369 
 
The dependent variable is an indicator set to 1 if the SEC litigates a firm in both administrative proceedings and a federal court, and 0 if the SEC 
brings administrative proceedings only. I estimate the models within the subsample of firm-years with corporate lobbying activities, using a Logit 
estimator with standard errors clustered by firm. The vector of controls mirrors those in Table 4. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% 
levels. I define all variables in Table 1.   
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Table 13. Commissioners’ political affiliation and an SEC enforcement action 
              
 Dependent variable: AAER 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ch_Lobby -0.299**      
 (-2.284)      
Ch_Lobby_Senate  -0.255**     
  (-2.247)     
Ch_Lobby_House   -0.341***    
   (-2.873)    
Ch_Lobby_2yr    -0.312**   
    (-2.420)   
Ch_Lobby_Senate_2yr     -0.237**  
     (-2.461)  
Ch_Lobby_House_2yr      -0.359*** 
      (-3.028) 
SEC_PA 5.059*** 5.013*** 5.115*** 5.157*** 5.083*** 5.255*** 
  (4.420) (4.426) (4.458) (4.467) (4.460) (4.540) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 982 982 982 982 982 982 
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.174 0.177 0.177 0.174 0.180 
 
The dependent variable is an indicator set to 1 if a firm receives an AAER during or within two years 
after a formal SEC investigation closes, and 0 otherwise. I estimate the models within the subsample of 
firm-years with corporate lobbying activities, using a Logit estimator with standard errors clustered by 
firm. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% 













Table 14. Meetings with SEC Chair and an SEC enforcement action 
 
 Dependent variable: AAER 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ch_Lobby -0.285** -0.299**   
 

















Chair_Congress_Meet  0.539* 
 
0.546* 
    (1.683)   (1.692) 
Control Variables Included Included Included Included 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 982 982 982 982 
Pseudo R2 0.193 0.180 0.194 0.182 
 
The dependent variable is an indicator set to 1 if a firm receives an AAER during or within two years 
after a formal SEC investigation closes, and 0 otherwise. I estimate the models within the subsample of 
firm-years with corporate lobbying activities, using a Logit estimator with standard errors clustered by 
firm. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% 



















Figure 1. Flowchart of an SEC Investigation and Enforcement Process  
 
 
The figure is from GAO report “Securities and Exchange Commission Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Planned Improvements 
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